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In this paper we analyse how the absence behaviour of Italian public sector employees has 
been affected by a law, passed in June 2008, reducing sick leave compensation and 
increasing monitoring intensity. We use micro-data on a sample of about 860 workers, 
employed at an Italian public administration, for years going from 2005 to 2009. We 
estimate the effect of the reform using linear and non-linear estimators. As predicted by 
agency theory, individuals react to economic incentives: the employees in our sample have 
considerably reduced their absences under the new regime. Since the reform has affected 
employees in a non uniform way, we show that the reduction of absenteeism is significantly 
stronger for employees suffering higher earning losses. Results also show that while the 
reform has reduced the duration of short absence spells, the duration of long spells has 
increased. We argue that this is due to the non-linearity of earning losses introduced by the 
new law. 
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1. Introduction 
Absenteeism represents a problem for the public sector of many countries. A number of works 
shows that public employees are more prone to taking sick leaves compared to similar 
employees working in the private sector (Barmby, Ercolani and Treble, 2002; Winkelmann, 
1999; Banerjee, et al., 2004). This phenomenon has reached in Italy very relevant proportions: 
according to the data from the Italian Economic Minister (Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze, Ragioneria Generale dello Stato), in year 2007 the Italian public sector employees took 
on average 15.1 days off due to sick-leave, 30% more than their private sector counterparts. 
These impressive figures in public sector absence rates produce direct costs, in terms 
of continued wage payment to absent workers, and indirect costs due to the adverse effects on 
the quality of services offered. 
With the aim to reduce the level of absenteeism among Italian public employees, in 
June 2008 the minister of the Public Administration, Renato Brunetta, has proposed a reform (in 
force since the 25
th of June 2008 and approved definitively by the law No. 133 of 2008) 
                                                      
∗ E-mail addresses: m.depaola@unical.it; v.pupo@unical.it; v.scoppa@unical.it. We would like to thank 
Mariarosaria Agostino, Giovanni Anania, Giorgio Brunello, Paola Cardamone, Giuliana De Luca and 
Michela Ponzo for useful suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
   2
changing both sick leave compensation and the intensity of monitoring of health status of absent 
employees. Before the reform, public sector employees were entitled to the full replacement of 
income for the first nine months of sickness and the intervention of an “official medical check” 
was left to the discretion of the employer. The law 133/2008, instead, has established that for 
each day of absence due to illness there will be a cut in some wage components (such as non-
base wage and productivity bonuses, which generally amount to 10-20% of the  total 
remuneration), for the first 10 days in each spell of absence. On the other hand, workers remain 
fully ensured for the days of absences exceeding the first 10 days in a single spell. A second 
important innovation introduced by the law was the imposition of a medical mandatory check 
even in the event of a single day of sick leave. 
Since workers are now only partially insured against earning losses due to sickness and 
because the monitoring has become more frequent, the cost of being absent from work has 
increased. Under the prediction of moral hazard theories that insured employees change their 
behaviour in relation to the generosity of sickness insurance, the reform should have produced a 
reduction in absences. On the other hand, the law has in practice increased the cost of returning 
to work after 10 days, since in the case in which the worker founds himself in the necessity to 
start a new absence spell he will incur again in wage reductions. As a consequence, workers on 
long absence spells may opportunistically decide to prolong the duration of their sickness 
leaves.  
We investigate the effects of the reform on employees absence behaviour using a unique 
dataset on a sample of about 860 workers employed mainly in administrative jobs in an Italian 
public organization, which provided us with very accurate register administrative data. We 
observe absence behaviour for each day in the period going from January 2005 to June 2009. In 
addition, we have information on some important individual characteristics and job attributes. 
Since workers included in our sample are covered by the same compulsory insurance 
programme, we do not face any selection problem in estimating the effects of the reform. 
Moreover, since the same employees are observed before and after the implementation of the 
reform, composition and heterogeneity effects are not relevant in our analysis and we are 
confident that the effect we estimate is causal. 
To disentangle the effects of the policy intervention from other confounding factors 
related to temporal trends or individual characteristics, we estimate a simple model relating the 
number of days of absences of an employee in a given quarter on a vector of individual 
characteristics, dummies for quarters, a quadratic time trend and a dummy variable, Reform, 
taking value one for the period during which the new law was in force (July 2008-June 2009). 
We use both a OLS estimator (controlling also for individual fixed effects) and a count 
estimator, to take into account the particular nature of our dependent variable.   3
From our analysis it emerges that absenteeism has been strongly affected by the policy 
intervention introduced in 2008. We find a reduction in absences of about 49%. The effect seem 
stronger for females (–56%), which are typically characterized by higher absence rates, but it is 
relevant also for men, for whom we observe a reduction of 40%. 
Since the new law has increased the cost of being absent in proportion to the non-base 
component of the wage, we have tried to understand whether the reduction of absences is 
directly related to the costs suffered by employees. At this aim, we have enriched our model 
using as explanatory variables the employee non-base wage and an interaction term between 
this component and the dummy Reform. From our estimates, it emerges that after the reform 
workers with a higher non-base wage have reduced their absences significantly more than 
workers with lower non-base wage. The evidence on the heterogeneous impact of the reform 
reassures us that our estimates are not capturing other causes of absenteeism, intervening 
simultaneously to the new regime. 
We have also investigated the effect of the reform on the probability of being absent and 
on the length of absence spells. In line with the fact that due to the reform the cost of beginning 
a work absence spell has unambiguously increased for workers, we find that the probability of 
being absent has been strongly reduced. As far as the effect on the length of absence spells is 
concerned, it emerges that while the duration of short absences spells has reduced, the new 
regime has induced workers to prolong absence spells with a duration higher than 10 days. This 
latter result could be due to the non-linearity of earning losses introduced by the new regime, 
which continues to provide full insurance for days of absence exceeding 10.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. In section 3 
the institutional framework, the data and some descriptive statistics are presented. In section 4 
to analyze the effects of the reform on employees’ absence behaviour we estimate both a OLS 
and a negative binomial model. Section 5 presents probit estimates of the probability of being 
absent. In section 6 we investigate the effects of the reform on the duration of absence spells. 
Section 7 concludes. 
    
2. Related Literature 
A growing economic literature is devoting attention to absenteeism analysing the effects on 
worker behaviour of a large number of variables (see, among others, Dionne and Dostie, 2007; 
Barmby, Ercolani, and Treble, 2002). Some of these variables are related to individual 
characteristics (gender, age, education, health status, etc.), while others are related to contractual 
and institutional aspects (such as the generosity of sickness benefits, the degree of employment 
protection, firm size, type of job, labour market conditions, etc.).   4
Since the worker’s effective state of health is typically costly to observe for the 
employer or for public authorities (and even for qualified physicians), sickness insurance creates 
a classical moral hazard problem for workers, who, given the prospect of gaining a wage 
without providing any effort are induced to take days off work. This opportunistic behaviour 
tend to be encouraged by employment protection measures.  
A number of works have focused their attention on the relationship between firing costs 
and absence behaviour showing that workers on fixed term contracts or on probation, for which 
contractual arrangements are characterized by less severe firing restrictions, present lower 
absence rates (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn, 2004; Arai and Thoursie, 2005; Scoppa, 
2009). Other works have highlighted a positive relationship between firm size and absence 
rates, which can be explained in relation to the higher monitoring costs faced by larger firms 
(Winkelman, 1999). Moreover, absence behaviour has also been shown to be negatively related 
to unemployment, since the threat of termination to prevent shirking tends to be related to 
labour market conditions (Leigh, 1985, Hesselius, 2007). 
The effects of sickness absence insurance, providing compensation for wage losses due 
to temporary illnesses, have been less investigated. This is especially true if we consider the 
huge literature on a similar form of insurance as unemployment benefits. The lack of research 
on this particular form of insurance is probably due to the limited availability of suitable data on 
employees absence behaviour. Empirical investigations trying to analyse the effects of changes 
in the level of insurance are based on the experience of few countries.  
A number of empirical analyses have been conducted considering Sweden, while little 
is known for other European countries. Johansson and Palme (2002 and 2005) consider the 
impact of a Swedish reform, which increased the cost of absences, on workers behaviour. From 
their analyses it emerges that employees reduce their rates of absenteeism when they experience 
a wage decrease upon absence. In a similar vein, Pettersson-Lidbom and Thoursie (2008) show 
that an increase in the benefit levels in Sweden in 1987 led to an increase in the incidence of 
absence spells. Henrekson and Persson (2004) using time series data from 1955 to 1999 confirm 
that more generous sick leave compensation lead to higher absenteeism rates. 
Ziebarth (2009) focuses on a change in the Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance, 
taking place in 1996 and concerning the income replacement level for spells of sickness 
exceeding six weeks. His findings suggest that the reform has produced a small decrease in the 
duration of long-term absenteeism only for the poor and middle-aged full-time employed 
persons. 
Curington (1994) and Meyer et al. (1995) examine the effects of several legislative 
changes in benefit levels on absence using US data. They show that increases in these benefits 
produce an increase of employees’ opportunistic behaviour.    5
An international comparison of the effects of sickness benefits on individual 
absenteeism is provided by Frick and Malo (2008). Using cross-section data from the European 
Survey on Working Conditions they show that individuals tend to be more absent in countries 
with higher level of sickness benefits. 
All in all, from the existing literature it emerges that reduction in sick pay may help at 
solving moral hazard problems that seem to be responsible for a considerable fraction of 
workplace absences. However, the literature on this issue provides evidence only for a small 
number of countries. Our analysis is an attempt to reduce this gap by providing evidence on a 
country that has not been investigated by previous works and contributing to a better 
understanding of the relationship between incentives and absence behaviour.  
  
3. Institutional Framework, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Until June 2008 employees in the Italian public sector were fully-insured against earning losses 
due to illness. According to the National Collective Employment Contract of public sector, 
public employees were entitled to the full replacement of wage income for the first nine months 
of illness. 
A decree approved by the Italian Government on the 26th June 2008 (and subsequently 
passed in the law 133/2008), has established that for each day of absence employees will incur a 
reduction in pay (for the first ten days of each absence spells), although not all components of 
salary will be affected. More precisely, wage cuts will apply to ancillary economic benefits and 
productivity bonuses, which make up approximately 10-20% of an employee total wage: 
therefore, the reform has reduced the replacement rate from 100% to a range of 80-90%. 
In addition to the reduction of the replacement rate, while previously sickness absences 
could be justified with a medical certificate by the individual own GP, the new regime has 
established that the employee’s health status must be certified with an official medical check by 
a physician appointed by a public authority (even for one day of absence). 
We exploit the changes introduced by the law 133/2008 to analyse the effects produced 
by different levels of sick leave compensation and monitoring intensity on the absence 
behaviour of a sample of workers employed at an Italian public administration. Our sample 
consists of 859 employees and we have information on their absence behaviour for each day in 
the period going from the 1
st of January 2005 to the 30
th of June 2009.
1 In addition, we have 
information on a number of personal characteristics (such us gender, age, education, marital 
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status, etc.) and on some relevant job features (such as qualifications and wage, decomposed in 
the components affected and not affected by the new regime).
2  
We use these information to create three measures of absence behaviour: the first is 
represented by the number of days of sick leave took by the workers in each quarter (Sickness 
Absences); the second is a dummy variable taking value one when the worker in a given quarter 
is absent at least one day (Absent); the third (Absence Duration) is the duration in days of each 
absence spell.  
We observe 859 workers for a maximum of 18 quarters, leading to a total of 12,857 
worker-quarter observations. Since some employees have been hired after January 2005 and 
some others retired before June 2009, the panel is not balanced. However, 637 workers are 
observed for all the 18 quarters. 
In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics on the employees analyzed in this study. 
They are on average 49 years old, about 42% of them are female and 63% are married with an 
average number of dependent children equal to 1.28.
3 The average tenure is around 14 years.
4 
About 6% of the sample workers are on fixed term contracts, while 1.7% of them have a part-
time job. Nearly 42% of workers live in the same area of their workplace.
5 The average yearly 
gross wage is 23,800 euro, while the non base wage is 2,230 euro.
6 28% of employees in our 
sample have attained a College degree (unfortunately, we have almost 200 missing values for 
this variable). 
As far as occupational variables are concerned, it is relevant to notice that the workers 
we consider are mainly employed in administrative jobs, which can be classified along 3 main 
levels: at the lower occupational level (“qualification B”) is employed 15% of the employees, 
53% of them have a job classified at the lower-intermediate level (“qualification C”) and 32% at 
upper-intermediate level (“qualification D”).  
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workplace is located or in neighbouring municipalities, and zero otherwise. 
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and white-collar worker households”.   7
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Age 859  48.558 9.147  23  67 
Female 859  0.424 0.494  0  1 
Married 859  0.629 0.483  0  1 
Dependent Children  859  1.283 1.082  0  5 
Living near work  859  0.414 0.492  0  1 
Tenure 859  13.616 8.477  0  35.583 
Fixed-Term contract  859  0.064 0.245  0  1 
Part-Time 859  0.017 0.130  0  1 
Non-base Wage (,000 €)  859  2.231 0.542  0.24  3.451 
Total Wage (,000 €)  859  23.823 5.403  1.358 62.953 
Qualification B  859  0.153 0.360  0  1 
Qualification C  859  0.531 0.499  0  1 
Qualification D  859  0.316 0.465  0  1 
College Degree  594  0.282 0.450  0  1 
 
 
Table 2 reports average days of absence (panel a) and the probability of being absent at 
least one day for each quarter (panel b) before and after the enforcement of the law (figures in 
bold refer to the period after the reform). On average, employees were absent 3.91 days before 
the reform
7 and 1.97 days after. The probability of being absent was of 0.53 before the 
enforcement of the law and it decreased to 0.29 afterwards. From Table 2 it is also possible to 
see that absence behaviour is strongly affected by seasonal factors: absences are more frequent 
in January-March, while it does not emerge a clear time trend. 
 
Table 2. Sickness absences and probability of being absent 
(a)  Sickness absences 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
January-March  4.628 3.867 4.366 4.602 2.195 
April-June  3.951 3.127 4.521 4.016 1.478 
July-September  3.968 3.016 3.849 2.091   
October-December  3.897 3.142 3.930 2.129   
         
(b)  Absent at least one day 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
January-March  0.612 0.548 0.550 0.628 0.315 
April-June  0.537 0.520 0.560 0.553 0.260 
July-September  0.472 0.473 0.493 0.279   
October-December  0.510 0.491 0.546 0.293   
 
The sharp reduction in absences observed since July 2008 is clearly described also in 
Figure 1, which shows the pattern followed by absences in the 18 quarters covered by our data. 
The vertical line at period 14 denotes the last period of the old regime (April-June 2008). 
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Figure 1. Sickness absences for quarters since 2005q1 
 
Following Johansson and Palme (2005), further evidence of the effect of the reform can 
be gathered if one compares, for example, the absences in the second semester of 2008 (in 
which the reform was in force) with the absences in the first semester of the same year: 
absences decrease on average of about 2.2 days, from 4.3 to 2.1 (see Table 3). However, to 
neutralize seasonal effects occurring between the first and second semester, we operate the same 
difference for the year 2007 and calculate the difference-in-differences. The difference between 
the second and the first semester of 2007 is much smaller, equal to 0.55. Therefore, we can 
ascribe to the reform the difference-in-differences, that is, a reduction of 1.64 days per quarter.
8 
 
Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of reform on absenteeism 
  Year 2007  Year 2008  Year 2008- Year 
2007 Difference 










–1.779     
(0.298) 








Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
In the next section we attempt to identify the causal effect of the policy intervention on 
absences carrying out an econometric analysis. 
 
 
                                                      
8 Similar figures are obtained comparing the first semester of 2009 with corresponding semesters before 
the reform.   9
4. The Impact of the Reform on Days Of Absence: OLS and 
Count Model Estimates 
Following Ichino and Riphahn (2005) in this section we firstly use a linear estimator to estimate 
several specifications of the following model: 
 
() ( ) ( ) it t j it it TimeTrend Quarter Z reform X Absences E ε φ γ δ β α + + + + + = | 
 
The dependent variable  it Absences  represents for employee i the number of days of absences 
due to sickness in a given quarter t (t=2005q1-2009q2); Reform is a dummy for the period (July 
2008-July 2009) covered by the new regime;  it Z  is a vector of individual characteristics which 
could affect absences (age, gender, marital status, children, etc.), Quarters are dummies for 
capturing seasonal effects, Time Trend  is a quadratic time trend to take into account temporal 
trends,  it ε  is an error term. 
Results using OLS are reported in Table 4. In all the specifications, standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered to take into account within-individual correlation 
of the error terms (Moulton, 1990). 
In Column (1) are reported results of our basic specification in which we control only 
for quarterly dummies and a quadratic time trend, without individual controls. Results show that 
the reform has determined a reduction of absences of 2.1 days per quarter, which represents a 
reduction of about 49% with respect to the year 2007. The coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level (t-stat=–7.8). Quarterly dummies confirm a seasonal pattern in absences, 
with the first quarter (January-March) showing more absences (the reference category is the 
second quarter). The coefficients on the time terms are not significantly, implying that employee 
absences do not follow a clear time trend.
9 
In column (2) we control for individual characteristics: age, gender, marital status, 
number of dependent children, tenure, dummies for whether the employee is on fixed term 
contract or has a part-time job, and a dummy indicating if the employee lives near the 
workplace. Results show – in line with the existing literature – that absences are higher for 
females (1.72 days more than males), increase with age (1.1 days every 10 years), are much 
lower for workers on fixed-term contracts. Living near the workplace significantly reduces 
absences. On the other hand, we do not find any statistically significant effect for marital status 
and for the number of children.
10  
                                                      
9 We also experimented controlling for a linear trend, a cubic trend and using yearly dummies (not 
reported) obtaining very similar results. 
10 This might be due to the fact that in Italy public employees can use special leaves for family needs.   10
Remarkably, controlling for individual characteristics does not change at all the effect 
of the reform on absences: the coefficient (and its standard error) in column (2) is almost 
unchanged. 
 
Table 4. The impact of the reform on employee absences. OLS regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Reform -2.100***  -2.090***  -1.566***  -2.289*** -2.061*** -2.030*** -1.854*** 
  (0.269) (0.268) (0.285) (0.268) (0.272) (0.273) (0.281) 
First Quarter  0.515***  0.498***  0.498*** 0.500*** 0.546*** 0.500*** 0.548*** 
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.161) (0.168) 
Third Quarter  -0.036  -0.014  -0.016 0.030 -0.114 -0.050 -0.168 
  (0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.191) (0.197) (0.191) (0.201) 
Fourth Quarter  0.007  0.051  0.050 0.088 -0.047 0.054 -0.096 
  (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.176) (0.183) (0.191) 
Linear term of the time trend  -0.061  -0.200 -0.215  -0.748*  -0.520  0.913***  0.835** 
  (0.303) (0.300) (0.300) (0.441) (0.432) (0.343) (0.366) 
Quadratic term of the time trend  0.021  0.035 0.038 0.113 0.060  -0.109*  -0.116* 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.073) (0.072) (0.061) (0.065) 
Age    0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.099***     
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)     
Female    1.722*** 2.002*** 1.787*** 1.906***     
    (0.298) (0.330) (0.303) (0.328)     
Married    0.021 0.023 0.083 0.382     
    (0.392) (0.392) (0.386) (0.407)     
Children    0.042 0.043 0.012 -0.158     
    (0.155) (0.155) (0.153) (0.157)     
Living near work    -0.883***  -0.880***  -0.821***  -0.540*     
    (0.286) (0.286) (0.291) (0.311)     
Tenure    0.018 0.017 0.039  0.043*     
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024)     
Fixed-Term Contract    -1.315*** -1.351*** -1.210*** -1.366***     
    (0.356) (0.356) (0.357) (0.400)     
Part-Time Job    -0.895**  -0.876**  -1.417***  -1.270**     
    (0.427) (0.435) (0.494) (0.506)     
Reform*Female     -1.257***      
     (0.342)      
Non-base Wage        -0.709*  -0.827**  0.997***  0.759** 
        (0.378) (0.387) (0.285) (0.323) 
Reform*(Non-base Wage)        -0.741** -0.916** -0.706** -0.668** 
        (0.362) (0.376) (0.315) (0.334) 
Constant 3.779***  -2.046**  -2.144** -0.002  0.532  0.021  0.815 
  (0.382) (0.901) (0.904) (1.564) (1.568) (0.974) (1.085) 
Observations  12857 12857 12857 12857 11194 12857 11194 
R-squared 0.011  0.048  0.049 0.050 0.049 0.014 0.016 
Number  of  Employees  859 859 859 859 637 859 637 
Sample  Whole Whole Whole Whole  Balanced  Whole  Balanced 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO NO  YES  YES 
Notes: The Table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the number of days of absence in a quarter. Standard 
errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
Very similar results are obtained also when we include among the controls the 
individual educational attainment, restricting the analysis to the sub-sample of workers for 
which this information is available (not reported).  
In column (3) of Table 4, using the interaction term Reform*Female, we investigate 
whether the reform has produced different effects according to gender: it emerges that females 
have reacted significantly more than males to the reform, reducing absences of 2.82 days 
(1.56+1.26) with respect to males (1.56). The effect is however strongly significant for both   11
genders. It is worthwhile to notice that females show typically higher absence rates and the 
larger impact of the policy intervention on their behavior can be explained by the larger room 
for reduction. 
In column (4) we turn our attention to a crucial aspect of the reform of sickness 
insurance: whereas before the reform, for each day of sickness, 100% of employees’ forgone 
earnings were covered, the new regime has established that the compensation level is reduced 
only to the “Base wage”, while other components, which we define “Non-base Wage”, will not 
be paid for the days of absence. The reduction applies to the first 10 days of absences in each 
single spell, but after the 11
th day the total wage is covered as before the reform. 
In our sample, the Non-base Wage amounts to about 10% of the total remuneration and 
differs according to job levels: for the median employee with a yearly Non-base Wage of 
€2,230, one day of absence corresponds to a cost of about €6.2. 
We use as additional explanatory variable the Non-base Wage and the interaction 
between this variable (de-meaned) and the dummy Reform. Results in column (4) show that 
employees with a higher Non-base Wage take a lower number of days off work both before and 
after the reform, but in line with the theoretical predictions of agency models, the reform has 
determined a reduction of absences much stronger for employees for whom this wage 
component is more relevant. The median employee has reduced absences of 2.3 days, while for 
individuals with an additional Non-base Wage of €1,000, the absences are further reduced by 
0.74 days (significant at the 5 percent level). 
Figure 2 shows – based on coefficients of column (4) – the relationship between days of 
absences and the Non-base Wage before (dashed line) and after the reform (solid line): the 
relationship is negatively sloped under both regimes, but after the reform the impact of a higher 
non-base wage on absences is much stronger. Note that for employees earning negligible 
amount as non-base wage, the reform has caused almost no difference in their propensity to be 
absent. However, less than 1% of employees in our sample gain a non-base wage below 1,000 
euro. 


























Figure 2. Sickness Absences in relation to Non-base 
Wage (pre and post reform) 
 
In order to avoid the effects due to a different composition of the workforce along time, 
we restrict our sample to only those 637 employees which we observe for all the 18 quarters 
(“Balanced panel”). Results in column (5) of Table 4 are very similar to those regarding the full 
sample of employees. 
The effect of the reform is furtherly investigated in column (6) (for the whole sample), 
and (7) (for the balanced panel), in which we control for individual fixed effects to take into 
account individual heterogeneity. Fixed effect estimates produce analogous results as regards 
the effect of the reform: an employee with an average Non-base Wage has reduced his/her 
sickness absences of about 2 days per quarter after the reform, while employees earning an 
additional 1,000 euro as non-base wage have further reduced their absences of 0.7 days. 
We have also experimented including among regressors the employee’s Total Wage. 
Estimates show that a higher wage significantly reduces employee absences, although in this 
case a serious problem of reverse causality might be present.
11 As regards the effects of the 
reform, results are very similar to those presented in Table 4 and are not reported. 
We have shown that absenteeism changed immediately after the reform. Although 
implausible, an alternative explanation could be that some other determinants of absenteeism 
changed exactly in the same period and produced the observed effect. We are able to discard 
this explanation since the reform has modified in a non uniform way the cost of being absent 
and we show that the reaction of the employees to the reform depends on the costs they incur. 
 
                                                      
11 One can expect employees working harder and making less absences are promoted and paid higher 
wages.    13
4.1. Estimates Using a Count Model 
Since our dependent variable, Sickness Absences, is a count variable which takes on 
nonnegative integer values, in this section we estimate the effects of the reform using a negative 
binomial model. The simpler Poisson model is strongly rejected because of the overdispersion 
of our dependent variable: the variance is much higher than the mean. The likelihood ratio test 
for the over-dispersion parameter α  shows that it is significantly different from zero, 
confirming that the Poisson model is not appropriate. 
Estimates using the negative binomial model are reported in Table 5. Results are similar 
to those obtained in the previous section using linear estimators. With the introduction of the 
reform, sickness absences are reduced by about 45% with respect to year 2007 and the 
employees earning a higher non-base wage reduce significantly more their absences. 
 
Table 5. Estimating the impact of the reform using Negative Binomial Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Reform -0.691***  -0.672***  -0.587***  -0.745*** -0.717***  -0.951***  -0.927*** 
  (0.098) (0.103) (0.124) (0.107) (0.105)  (0.107)  (0.108) 
First Quarter  0.162***  0.163***  0.163*** 0.167*** 0.183***  0.271***  0.280*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.047) 
Third Quarter  0.009  -0.026  -0.027 -0.014 -0.051  -0.048  -0.064 
  (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.065) 
Fourth Quarter  0.022  0.017  0.018 0.032 0.013  -0.038  -0.048 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.055) 
Linear term of trend  0.024  0.053  0.045 -0.055 -0.091  0.317**  0.254* 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.133) (0.131)  (0.144)  (0.146) 
Quadratic term of trend  -0.003  -0.012 -0.010 0.002  0.006 -0.038  -0.033 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Age    0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.028***     
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)     
Female    0.489*** 0.534*** 0.494*** 0.524***     
    (0.084) (0.079) (0.084) (0.090)     
Married    0.072 0.071 0.090 0.131     
    (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) (0.125)     
Children    0.027 0.028 0.015 -0.039     
    (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048)     
Living near work    -0.250***  -0.248***  -0.244***  -0.189**     
    (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.090)     
Tenure   0.010  0.010  0.015*  0.017**     
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)     
Fixed-Term Contract    -0.652*** -0.661*** -0.590*** -0.621***     
    (0.205) (0.204) (0.207) (0.218)     
Part-Time  Job    -0.662*** -0.652*** -0.785*** -0.707***     
    (0.240) (0.241) (0.247) (0.264)     
Reform*Female     -0.218        
     (0.136)        
Non-base Wage        -0.165  -0.207*  0.429***  0.285** 
       (0.102)  (0.107)  (0.110)  (0.113) 
Reform*(Non-base Wage)        -0.317* -0.430***  -0.522***  -0.496*** 
       (0.171)  (0.162)  (0.163)  (0.164) 
Constant 1.275***  -0.673**  -0.684** -0.252  0.122  -1.091***  0.606 
  (0.112) (0.302) (0.299) (0.459) (0.453)  (0.389)  (0.396) 
Observations  12857 12857 12857 12857 11194  12857  11194 
Log pseudolikelihood  -26499.828  -26134.687 -26131.623 -26117.101 -22974.209     
Number of Employees  859  859  859  859  637  859  637 
Sample  Whole Whole Whole Whole  Balanced  Whole  Balanced 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO NO  YES  YES 
Notes: The Table reports negative binomial regressions. The dependent variable is the number of days of absence in a 
quarter. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level) are reported in parentheses. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.   14
 
 
5. The Effects on the Probability of Being Absent 
The variable Days of Absence is heavily concentrated on 0: about 52% of employees has 0 days 
of absence in a given quarter. Moreover, a small fraction of employees has more than 30 days of 
absences and the estimates could be heavily influenced by these observations. 
Therefore, as robustness check, in this section, we estimate the probability that a worker 
has been absent for at least one day during a given quarter. More precisely, we build the 
dependent variable  it Absent  that takes value equal to one if worker i was absent for at least one 
day in a given quarter t and zero otherwise.  
In Table 6 are reported the same specifications presented in Table 4 using an OLS 
estimator. In columns 1-5 we report estimates obtained using a Probit model, while in columns 
6 and 7 are reported estimates of a linear probability model in which we control for individual 
fixed effects.
12  
In column (1) are presented the results of our basic specification, in which we control 
only for quarterly dummies and a quadratic time trend. In line with the fact that the reform has 
unambiguously increased for employees the cost of beginning a new absence spell, it emerges 
that after the reform the probability of being absent has decreased of about 25.7 percentage 
points, from an observed probability of being absent of 48%, implying a reduction of more than 
50%. The estimates reported in column (2), controlling for individual characteristics, show very 
similar results. In column (3), it is possible to see that females have reduced their probability of 
being absent more than males, but the effect is rather imprecisely estimated (p-value: 0.19).  
Starting from column (4) we estimate the interaction between the Non-base Wage and 
the Reform. Estimates results confirm that employees with a higher Non-base Wage, which is 
proportional to the cost of being absent, after the reform have reduced significantly more their 
probability of being absent. The results of estimates controlling for individual fixed effects in 
columns (6) and (7) confirm these findings. The interaction term Reform*(Non-base Wage) is 
significant at the 1 percent level.
13 
 
                                                      
12 We obtain almost identical results if we use a linear probability model for all specifications. 
13 A very similar effect emerges when we look at the number of absence spells: the number of spells for 
each employee (per quarter) has reduced from 1.57 to 0.77 after the reform.   15
Table 6. The impact of the reform on the probability of being absent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Reform -0.257***  -0.268***  -0.254***  -0.286*** -0.278*** -0.248*** -0.246*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
First Quarter  0.046***  0.047***  0.047*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Third Quarter  -0.043***  -0.043***  -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.050*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Fourth  Quarter  -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Linear term of trend  0.012  0.005  0.004 -0.058** -0.049  0.069***  0.066*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.030) (0.020) (0.022) 
Quadratic term of trend  -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 0.009* 0.007  -0.009**  -0.009** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age    0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.004*     
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
Female    0.193*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.215***     
    (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)     
Married    0.011 0.011 0.017 0.033     
    (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035)     
Children   0.026**  0.026**  0.023*  0.013     
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)     
Living near work    -0.054**  -0.054**  -0.047*  -0.051*     
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)     
Tenure    0.004**  0.004** 0.006*** 0.005**     
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
Fixed-Term Contract    -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.154*** -0.167***     
    (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.062)     
Part-Time  Job   -0.117  -0.117  -0.170**  -0.132    
    (0.087) (0.087) (0.083) (0.098)     
Non-base Wage        -0.078***  -0.083***  0.079***  0.055*** 
        (0.027) (0.031) (0.017) (0.019) 
Reform*(Non-base Wage)        -0.061* -0.077**  -0.061***  -0.050** 
        (0.032) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) 
Constant        0.244***  0.324*** 
        (0.060)  (0.066) 
Reform*Female     -0.035        
     (0.027)        
Individual Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO NO  YES  YES 
Observations  12857 12857 12857 12857 11194 12857 11194 
Number  of  Employees  859 859 859 859 637 859 637 
Log-likelihood  -8594.86 -8191.11 -8189.90 -8158.33 -7128.86     
obs.  P  0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.492     
Pseudo  R-squared  0.034 0.080 0.080 0.083 0.081     
R-squared        0.067  0.074 
Sample  Whole  Whole  Whole  Whole Balanced Whole Balanced 
Notes: The Table reports Probit estimates of the probability of being absent at least one day in a quarter in columns 1-5. Marginal 
effects are reported. In columns 6-7 we estimate with a linear probability model controlling for individual fixed effects. Standard 
errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
6. Contrasting Effects on the Duration of Absence Spells 
The analysis we have conducted in the previous sections has shown that the law 133/2008 has 
produced a very strong impact, significantly reducing the average number of days of absences 
for quarter and the probability of being absent.  
An interesting aspect not yet considered is the effect of the reform on the duration of 
absence spells. In this section we investigate whether the reform has affected the choice of 
returning to work for those workers who have started a spell of absence.    16
In undertaking this type of analysis, it is important to bear in mind that the reform 
imposes earning losses to absent workers only for the first 10 days of absence in each spell, 
while workers remain fully ensured for the days of sickness absences exceeding 10 days.  
This non-linearity implies that the expected cost of continuing an absence spell depends 
on how long the work absence period lasts. For absence spells less that 10 days, two 
countervailing forces come in place: on the one hand, there is the increased direct cost of 
continuing the spell until the threshold of 10 days is reached, on the other hand, there is an 
increased cost of returning to work and being exposed to the risk of getting on a new absence 
spell. For spells longer than 10 days, there is not any direct cost of prolonging the absence 
period, but there is a possible cost of returning to work if additional days of absence become 
necessary.
14 
In Figure 3 the patterns followed by the average duration of short (panel a) and long 
absences spells (panel b) are shown (respectively spells shorter or equal to 10 days and spells 
longer than 10 days) in the 18 quarters covered by our data. After the reform, denoted by the 
vertical line, the duration of short absence spells has reduced from 1.74 to 1.52 days, but this 
reduction might be difficult to disentangle from the declining and smooth pattern taking place 
from 2005 to 2009. 
 
(a) Short absence spells 
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Figure 3. Duration of short and long absence spells 
 
Somewhat different appears the pattern followed by the duration of long absence spells, 
shown in panel (b). From this figure it does not emerge any clear temporal trend. The duration 
of long absence spells is higher after the reform, increasing from 24.05 to an average duration of 
25.15. 
To try to disentangle the effect of the reform on spell duration from temporal trends we 
have re-organized the data at spell level (each unit of observation is an absence spell, for a total 
of 18,608 observations) and estimated a model for Absence Duration using a negative binomial 
                                                      
14 Moreover, employees opportunistically planning to take a number of days of absence higher than 10 
days may find it convenient to take all the absences together (without incurring earning losses after the 
first 10 days) rather than split them in shorter spells.   17
estimator.
15 To take into account that the reform may have affected in a different way the 
duration of long and short spells, following the approach of Johansson and Palme (2005), we 
introduce in our model two dummy variables: the first one “Spell longer than 10 days” takes 
value 1 for absence spells longer than 10 days and zero otherwise, the second one “Spell 
between 8 and 10 days” takes value one for absence spells with a duration between 8 and 10 
days. We use the latter dummy variable to consider that once the worker is near the threshold 
value of 10 days the indirect cost of returning to work may be greater than the direct cost of 
continuing the absence spell.  
We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction terms between both these dummies 
with the Reform indicator. In Table 7 are presented our estimates in which the dummy Reform 
shows now the effect of the new regime on absence spells shorter than 8 days. In column (1) it 
emerges a negative effect of the reform on absence spells shorter than 8 days and a positive 
effect on the duration of absence spells between 8 and 10 days and spells longer than 10 days. In 
particular, after the reform the average duration of short absence spells has reduced of about 
7%, while the duration of absence spells longer than 10 days has increased of 19%. 
In column (2) and (3) we report separate estimates for males and females, respectively. 
While for men the reform has reduced the duration of short absence spells, the effect is 
statistically insignificant for women. Males and females react similarly to the increased cost of 
returning to work after 10 days: the interaction term Reform*(Spell longer than 10) is positive 
and statistically significant for both. 
In column (4) we control for individual fixed effects. While the sign of the coefficients 
or our interest are not changed, the magnitude of the effects turns out to be smaller. 
 
                                                      
15 We do not use a duration model since in our sample only few observations are censored at 30 June 
2009.   18
Table 7. Duration of Absence Spells. Negative Binomial Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.0651**  -0.1283***  -0.0068  -0.0493* 
  (0.0297) (0.0442) (0.0393) (0.0292) 
Spell  longer  than  10  2.6836*** 2.7178*** 2.6517*** 2.5893*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0288) 
Spell between 8 and 10  1.7298***  1.7143***  1.7316***  1.6748*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0174) (0.0134) (0.0201) 
Reform*(Spell between 8 and 10)  0.1346***  0.1578***  0.1260***  0.0519 
  (0.0284) (0.0474) (0.0408) (0.0554) 
Reform*(Spell longer than 10)  0.1817***  0.1669*  0.1962**  0.1182** 
  (0.0678) (0.0976) (0.0900) (0.0595) 
First  Quarter  0.0972*** 0.1295*** 0.0687*** 0.0911*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0231) (0.0212) (0.0148) 
Third  Quarter  0.0156 0.0207 0.0130 0.0196 
  (0.0194) (0.0286) (0.0266) (0.0179) 
Fourth Quarter  0.0053  0.0457  -0.0334  -0.0006 
  (0.0191) (0.0285) (0.0253) (0.0182) 
Linear term of the time trend  -0.0823***  -0.1804***  0.0049  0.0496 
  (0.0276) (0.0409) (0.0373) (0.0693) 
Quadratic term of the time trend  0.0076  0.0278***  -0.0104  0.0025 
  (0.0055) (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0054) 
Age  0.0048*** 0.0052*** 0.0053***  -0.1036* 
  (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0569) 
Female 0.0022      -1.2964* 
  (0.0124)    (0.6682) 
Married 0.0174  -0.0292  0.0518**  1.4064*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0296) (0.0204) (0.4617) 
Children 0.0016  0.0158  -0.0122  -1.4921* 
  (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0087) (0.8313) 
Tenure -0.0053***  -0.0086***  -0.0028**  0.0028 
  (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0079) 
Fixed-Term Contract  -0.1192*** -0.0949  -0.1071**  0.0217 
  (0.0351) (0.0611) (0.0431) (0.0810) 
Living near work  0.0322***  0.0479***  0.0078  -0.3154 
  (0.0121) (0.0185) (0.0166) (0.2105) 
Part-Time  Job  0.0542 -0.0076 0.0603  0.2383** 
  (0.0704) (0.0833) (0.0972) (0.1120) 
Constant  0.4106*** 0.5248*** 0.2895***  7.2820* 
  (0.0575) (0.0832) (0.0712) (3.7593) 
Observations 18608  8577  10031  18608 
Notes: The Table reports negative binomial regressions. The dependent variable is the duration of absence spells in days. 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level) are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
In the attempt to discourage absenteeism of Italian public employees, the law 133/2008 has 
reduced sick leave compensation of about 10 percentage points and has increased monitoring. 
Theoretical models analyzing individual moral hazard in insurance contracts predict a reduction 
of absences following a cut in the degree of insurance coverage. 
Thanks to the availability of a rich dataset offering detailed information on the absence 
behaviour of the employees of an Italian public administration from years going from 2005 to 
2009 we have analyzed the effects of this policy intervention. 
Firstly, we have focused our attention on the effects of the reform on the average 
number of days of absence and on the probability of being absent. Once we control for   19
individual characteristics, seasonal effects and time trends it emerges that the reform has 
determined a reduction of absences of about 49%. A slightly higher effect emerges when we 
control for individual fixed effects. A sharp reduction is observed also on the worker probability 
of taking days off work. In this case the estimated effect is of 50%. The effect is statistically 
significant both for males and females, but it is larger for females.  
Since earning losses for each day of absence are related to the worker non-base wage, 
we have investigated whether the effects of the reform are related to the size of earning losses 
suffered. In line with predictions of agency models, it emerges that employees who incur higher 
costs for being absent have reduced their absences much more: employees with a daily cost of € 
6.2 (corresponding to the median non-base wage of € 2,230) have reduced their absences of 2.28 
days per quarter, while employees with a daily cost of  € 3.40 (corresponding to a non-base 
wage of € 1,230) have reduced their absences of 1.54 days. 
In the final part of our analysis we have turned our attention to the duration of absence 
spells. In relation to the fact that the reform imposes earning losses to absent workers only for 
the first 10 days of absence, workers on long absence spells may be induced to postponing their 
return to work to avoid the risk of starting a new absence spell and suffering again a wage 
reduction. In line with this hypothesis, from our analysis it emerges that the duration of short 
absence spells has been negatively affected by the reform, but the duration of absence spells 
exceeding 10 days has increased as a consequence of the new regime.  
Our data allows us to be confident that the uncovered effect is causal. First, we observe 
the same employees before and after the change of the regulation and, therefore, the observed 
differences in behavior do not reflect self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity. Second, by 
exploiting the fact that the reform has affected employees in a non uniform way and showing 
that absenteeism has reduced much more for employees whose cost of being absent increased 
more, we are able to discard the influence of other possible factors simultaneously affecting 
employees’ absence behavior. 
Our analysis clearly shows that incentives matter a lot, confirming the main theoretical 
predictions of the literature on contracts in asymmetric information contexts. Employees have 
strongly reacted to the new regime that has changed the terms of their sickness insurance 
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